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Abstract. In this dialogue, we discuss the contrast between inexorable physical 
laws and the semiotic freedom of life. We agree that material and symbolic 
structures require complementary descriptions, as do the many hierarchical levels 
of their organizations. We try to clarify our concepts of laws, constraints, rules, 
symbols, memory, interpreters, and semiotic control. We briefly describe our 
different personal backgrounds that led us to a biosemiotic approach, and we 
speculate on the future directions of biosemiotics. 
  
 
We have started this conversation standing at the base of Massachu-
setts’ highest mountain. The forest on the top was hidden from our sight 
by clouds. We talked on several biosemiotic themes, which we develop 
further here; but where they lead us is unpredictable. That is life. 
 
 
1. The regions for life in the physical world 
 
K. The first problem we need to solve is evidently to demonstrate how 
the possibility of choosing one’s path — a characteristic feature of all 
life — can be embedded into the picture of physical world which is 
based on inexorable physical laws. Everything in the world (at least 
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that can be measured) is consistent with physical laws. Yet there is 
what you have characterized as open-ended evolution.1 Would you 
agree if we call it — equivalently — as a freedom to establish new rules? 
 
H. Yes, it would certainly include establishing new rules, but by open-
ended I want to include any emergent structure, function or behavior 
that can be imagined — or perhaps even behavior that we can’t 
imagine because of the limitations of our current brains. We can’t 
predict what novelties evolution might produce.  
 
K. The open-ended evolution includes then two distinct properties. (1) 
an immense2 number of potential forms, and (2) a basic unpre-
dictability of the paths evolution will take. These features, accordingly, 
apply to biological evolution and do not apply to the evolution in non-
living world.  
 
H. The physical basis of the immense number of forms is a con-
sequence of the immense number of linear sequences of material units 
that laws cannot distinguish because of their similar energy or similar 
stability. This is the genetic memory. Only some form of “frozen acci-
dent” or higher level selection process affects which memory sequen-
ces survive over time. Not only are the initial sequences unpredictable, 
but their physical structure appears to be largely arbitrary. Natural 
selection is also unpredictable because of its complexity and the inde-
finite time period over which selection continues to work.  
The most obvious, and I would say the most important, similarities 
of genetic language and human natural, formal, and computer 
languages is their expression by such discrete, linear strings using only 
a small, materially arbitrary alphabet. It is just these properties that 
allow simple and reliable writing, reading, and storage in a memory 
                                                 
1   For example, Pattee 1988: 69.  
2   With this term I would refer to Walter Elsasser (1998: 49ff) who has 
emphasized the role of immenseness in this sense as a characteristic feature of life. 
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that is lawfully undetermined, and that allows practically unlimited 
information capacity.  
 
K. The consistency with physical laws means that everything is depen-
dent on the laws — none of biological or mental processes is in-
consistent with any physical law. However, as you say, this does not 
mean that everything is determined by the laws.3 The “regions of 
indeterminacy” are supposedly those in which life can establish itself 
and evolve. Is it possible to describe these regions of indeterminacy 
and how they arise? 
 
H. The inexorable character of physical law is often misunderstood to 
imply determinism. This is not the case. There are innumerable struc-
tures in the universe that physical laws do not determine. It is also 
important to understand why lawfully indeterminate does not mean 
physically indistinguishable.  
Since all the basic laws of physics are expressed in terms of energy, 
systems with two or more states with the same energy are lawfully 
indeterminate. However, in many cases we can distinguish these states 
by measurements of their initial conditions. These law-equivalent 
states are often called degeneracies or symmetries. 
A common example is chirality, or left and right handedness. 
Chemically, amino acids and proteins can be left or right handed, and 
they cannot be distinguished by the laws that they both obey. 
Nevertheless, most types of biochemicals in living organisms must 
stick with one or the other.  
This is like our driving on one side of the road. Either side would 
work just as well as the other, but we have to choose one for traffic to 
function efficiently. Such symmetry-breaking events that persist for 
structural, functional, or selective reasons are appropriately called 
“frozen accidents”. 
The most important energy-degenerate structures for life and 
language are the linear strings of discrete units like nucleic acids and 
                                                 
3   Pattee 2008: 151. 
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the strings of symbols like the words on this page that form a memory. 
It is just because of the immense numbers of these energy-indeter-
minate but structurally distinguishable strings of symbols that their 
information storage capacity is open-ended. These distinguishable 
sequences and the information they contain are not determined or 
restricted by natural laws; but their relative permanence is the result of 
frozen accidents, and natural or cultural selection in specific environ-
ments. Most linguistic conventions are probably frozen accidents. It is 
possible that the genetic code and consequently life itself began as a 
broken symmetry that became a frozen accident.  
 
K. Isn’t redundancy a more precise term than degeneracy in these 
cases? 
 
H. The word “degeneracy” is physical jargon that is not equivalent to 
“redundancy”. More precisely, linear copolymers are “near-degene-
racies” meaning that their stabilities or lifetimes are nearly the same as 
long as they remain linear and isolated. So far this is just a “meaning-
less” physical necessity that allows an unlimited variety of sequences.  
Degeneracy is more closely related to what physicists call a sym-
metry where any change of sequence order does not change the law-
based description. Degeneracy has nothing to do yet with semiotics or 
potential functions where “redundancy” may have meaning. 
 
K. Still, it seems to me, we have not yet entirely explained how the 
living systems — or sign processes — escape from the determinism of 
the physical laws. Because the existence of energetically degenerate 
states yet does not mean that what will happen will not be determined 
by the initial conditions — as for instance in case of a growth of a 
nucleotide strain, the choice of the next nucleotide is not determined 
by the previous nucleotide, however it can be determined by a 
movement of the nucleotides around (e.g., the one that will reach the 
endpoint of the strain first would stay there). 
A biosemiotic conversation: Between physics and semiotics  315
In other words, in order to explain the appearance of semiotic 
freedom4 the existence of law-equivalent events is necessary, but this 
cannot be achieved on solely molecular level. It is necessary to 
demonstrate the emergence of non-determined regulation by boun-
dary conditions. Otherwise the freedom is basically illusionary, as for 
instance Daniel Dennett would claim. 
 
H. The concept of absolute determinism as envisioned by Laplace and 
philosophers like Dennett, has turned out in physics to be an un-
supportable and unproductive way of thinking. Determinism is an 
untestable metaphysical concept. First of all, measurement processes 
are irreversible and therefore dissipative and subject to error, so 
determinism is not empirically verifiable. All the fundamental laws are 
consistent only with a probabilistic universe. We have enough “free-
dom” just because of the undeterminable or equivalent probabilities of 
many structures, like polymer sequences.  
There is also plenty of freedom just at this molecular level to allow 
brains to make choices because all brain function is dependent on the 
molecular level. As Arthur Eddington (1929: 260) noted long ago: 
“There is nothing to prevent the assemblage of atoms constituting a 
brain from being of itself a thinking object [with “free will”] in virtue 
of that nature which physics leaves undetermined and undetermin-
able”. 
 
K. You have used the term constraint as a central notion in your 
writings. How should constraint be defined? 
 
H. In physics a constraint is a local structure that limits the motions of 
otherwise “free” particles that are governed only by the laws of motion. 
However, the concept of constraint is also used to describe levels of 
hierarchical organizations. Generally speaking, each higher level re-
quires a constraint that is described by fewer observables than the 
                                                 
4   The concept of semiotic freedom is central to Jesper Hoffmeyer’s writings (for 
example, Hoffmeyer 2008). 
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lower level description. More precisely, a constraint is an alternative 
simplified description of structures that are not usefully described by 
the behavior at a more detailed lower level.  
A simple example is a closed box that limits the detailed motions of 
the gas molecules inside. The box itself is also made of molecules, but 
they are constrained by chemical bonds to form a solid structure. So 
we simplify the description of the box by describing only its geometric 
boundaries, and we ignore the detailed molecular structure of the box 
itself. Such constraints are also called “boundary conditions”. 
A more complicated example is an internal combustion engine. 
The entire engine is made of molecules, but they are so rigidly 
constrained as solid parts that we can usefully describe the engine’s 
motion by just one rotational degree of freedom. Engines constrain 
the gas molecules in the cylinders so that, by coupling to several higher 
levels of fixed and moving constraints, it does useful work.  
A very complicated example is the computer that at the lowest level 
simply constrains the flow of electrons. At a higher design level these 
constraints are described as circuits, memories and gates. However, 
when we use a computer we ignore this hardware level of constraint 
because it is more practical to control its behavior at a higher level of 
symbolic constraint we call a code or program. A reasonably complete 
understanding of a modern computer requires different descriptions 
and languages for at least six levels of constraints.  
Biosemiotics covers even more levels of constraints, from the 
chemical bonds that constrain gene sequences, enzyme dynamics, and 
cell membranes, to the matter-symbol transition of the structural 
genes and the epigenetic controls of development, and finally to the 
nervous system architecture and the brain. Consequently our bio-
semiotic models require many different levels of descriptions. Failure 
to recognize that these different levels of descriptions are necessary 
and complementary often causes useless arguments over which is the 
“best” description. 
By contrast with the computer, the organism itself must develop 
almost all of its higher level constraint structures under the super-
vision of the genetic description. The genetic constraints harness the 
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self-organizing physical laws with great efficiency, like protein folding 
and the self-assembly of components, all of which follow energy 
dependent laws. In other words, a relatively few genetic constraints 
control a large number of energy-based physical actions and construc-
tions. As we now are learning from gene sequencing, the simple 
structural genes are only a small fraction of the genome. Most of the 
genome is made up of control sequences that are coordinated by extre-
mely complex linkages. How this coordination arises is the key 
problem of evolution and development (Pattee 1971a). 
 
K. Thus, there are constraints both in the non-living and the living 
world. But aren’t these constraints radically different? As we can ob-
serve, the constraints in the living world are, (a) fundamentally 
individual, due to the individuality of each organism, and (b) mutual 
or reciprocal, due to the communication processes that occur between 
any living beings, between the cells, and between the organisms. As a 
result of the individual and mutual constraints, the relations become 
established between the living systems — the relations (I would see 
these also as rules, or codes) that might be unpredictable from the 
physical laws. 
 
H. Yes, living and nonliving constraints are radically different for the 
reasons you give. Nonliving constraints are not constructed from 
heritable memory that persists by natural selection. Living constraints 
occur in individuals with a memory. Genes are the memory that define 
the individual. As Hippocrates recognized, your conscious individual 
self is memory in your brain. All your other organs can be trans-
planted without changing your individual awareness. The same is true 
of the genes at the cellular level. 
 
K. A living system can establish constraints and do work in this way. 
Via doing work, it can then build whichever structures, both useful 
and just for fun, or also in a “let’s see what comes out of it” way. The 
work done with the help of constraints is all using physical processes, 
which means that no freedom from the laws, no indeterminacy is 
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really required for this part of the life process. The freedom from laws 
(in the sense of law-equivalence, or indeterminacy), however, as it 
seems, is necessary in order to make choices, i.e. to behave in a way 
that would not be predictable by any computational means. 
 
H. To be more precise, you never have “freedom from laws” but only 
freedom of initial or boundary conditions. You have to make a clear 
distinction between laws and constraints. Laws are universal and 
inexorable. Nothing is free of laws. Constraints are local structures 
that obey laws but are not determined or predictable by laws. Memory 
is a special type of constraint that can alter or control the lawful course 
of local events. Polanyi’s (1968) phrase “harnessing the laws” is apt.  
It is only memory constraints that allow an organism’s heritability, 
variation and natural selection. At the cognitive level, it is only by 
consulting our memory that we feel we are making choices. A sudden 
response to a stimulus, like a loud noise, does not feel like a choice. 
 
K. Nevertheless, we may probably think of common free behaviour 
also without any inclusion of law-equivalent states. For instance, if a 
behavioural act is a habit-based search for an object represented by its 
memory, driven by an organism’s need and taking into account the 
umwelt around — it is not obvious that any law-equivalent state is 
required for such a behaviour.  
 
H. Exactly. It is just because it is law-equivalent that that law-based 
thinking is irrelevant. Semiotic expression is free of physical laws. The 
existence of any memory requires many law-equivalent states. In fact, 
the information capacity of a memory is defined in terms of the 
number of law-equivalent (equiprobable) states. 
 
K. A behavioural act may result in some learning, which means a 
slight change of memory, and thus the behaviour will be fully indi-
vidual, and also unpredictable, because the response cannot be 
calculated — exactly analogically to the complete function of an 
enzyme that also cannot be calculated. Thus, a question still is: 
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whether a complex individuality is not already sufficient to provide all 
behaviours the organisms may have?  
 
H. Again I would say that any “complex individuality” is defined only 
by its memory, and therefore such memory-controlled individuals 
would be capable of evolving or learning many forms of behavior.  
 
K. A particular constraint can be produced deterministically, like the 
shores of a river as the river is shaping them. But if there is a system of 
constraints, in which the constraints mutually rebuild each other, 
whereas the reproduction of the constraints is based on a non-exact 
mutual recognition, then an identity can arise, which turns out to be 
quite independent from microprocesses.  
For instance, in a population of biparentally reproducing orga-
nisms each individual is genetically different from any other, but they 
recognise each other when producing offspring and thus form a 
species that holds itself. 
This is like an ongoing communication, in which the commu-
nicants reciprocally constrain each other and thus the self-identity of 
the communication process is kept. Life is probably just this kind of 
general communication process. 
In order to get life running, what is required is an inheritance 
mechanism, i.e. memory — the one that consumes energy in order to 
rebuild itself; the inheritance mechanism5 obviously has to include 
semiosis, because it has to find and recognise its building blocks. And 
the inheritance mechanism is nothing else than a general self-
supporting communication mechanism, as I just tried to describe it. 
 
H. I would agree that even the simplest reproduction requires the 
communication of information from parent to offspring. All multi-
cellular development is also dependent on communication between 
                                                 
5   Inheritance is meant here in a broad sense, like, for instance, Jablonka and 
Lamb (2005), who include into it the epigenetic, genetic, behavioural, and 
symbolic inheritance. 
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cells. I would still argue that some form of memory, not necessarily 
discrete symbol strings, is the source of all heritable information. 
Where would a semiotician say symbols are located when not in use? 
 
K. That’s right. Where memory, of course, is not just a structure but a 
correspondence (i.e., a relation between structures) that is modified 
and conveyed in semiosis. 
Thus biosemiotics is the field that not only tackles the mind-matter 
problem, but also addresses the problem of complementarity of 
semiotic and physical descriptions at all levels. There is a whole series 
of problems of the “symbol-matter” type that you have listed in your 
writings. Can you describe these? 
 
H. The amazing property of symbols is their ability to control the 
lawful behavior of matter, while the laws, on the other hand, do not 
exert control over the symbols or their coded references. It is just for 
this reason that evolution can construct endless varieties of species and 
the brain can learn and create endless varieties of models of the world.  
That is why organisms and symbol systems in some sense locally 
appear to escape the global behavior of physical laws, yet without ever 
disobeying them. Fully understanding this power of symbols over 
matter at all evolutionary levels is what I call “the symbol-matter 
problem”. 
The four most notorious symbol-matter levels are the genetic code 
in biology, pattern recognition and sensorimotor control in nervous 
systems, the measurement and control problem in physics, and the 
mind-body problem in philosophy.     
 
K. It occurs to me that any true model of semiosis has to include in 
itself the “symbol-matter problem” as you call it. The models of sign 
that don’t include it may be useful in certain cases, but in order to be a 
model of semiosis, i.e. of sign process, the inclusion of symbol-matter 
problem is inescapable. 
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H. I think the “symbol-matter problem” is maybe not the best name 
because it is a triadic relation. The symbol and matter must be con-
nected by an intepreter (Peirce’s “system of interpretance”). Following 
the physicists’ use of “cut” to separate the measurement from what is 
measured, I have also called the necessary separation of symbol and 
referent the “epistemic cut” which is also a triadic relation that must 
comprise the interpreter.  
Both these phrases appear to evade the problem because symbol, 
matter, and cut are relatively simple to describe compared to what is 
necessary to describe for an actual measurement process or any system 
of interpretance. I have said, along with most biosemioticians, that the 
simplest system of interpretance is the living cell (Pattee 1969). I have 
also suggested that the enzyme constitutes the simplest functional 
measuring device (Pattee 1971b). Only if the enzyme recognizes (mea-
sures) its substrate by binding does it function as a specific catalyst. 
Furthermore, the relation between its substrate recognition and its 
catalytic function is not determined by laws but only by virtue of its 
genetic construction. 
 
K. I think we need a special term to mark the connections or struc-
tures that are made specifically by semiosis, i.e. via a semiotic control. 
These are the pieces of semiosis “left behind”, the fractions that are 
produced as parts of relations or codes, or of memory. In the cultural 
sphere, these are usually called ‘artefacts’, but as far as I know there is 
no general term for this in biology or in physics.6 These are the struc-
tures made when using the physical indeterminacy — like the proteins 
that are built by ribozymes, or the nests built by birds. Most of the 
living matter (as chemical structures) is such, and also what remains 
                                                 
6   Except a proposal made by M. Barbieri who proposes simply to extend the 
term ‘artefact’ over the everything made (or manufactured) by life. Another, but 
different approach is developed by J. Deely, who is extending the term ‘object’ to 
anything what is either recognised or produced; since, however, the objects are (as 
Deely argues) always a part of the action of signs, this leads him as a result to 
extend the semiosis to occur in the non-living world.  
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after an organism has died, so most of the material in ecosystems 
belongs to this, because it is made via semiotic control.  
What is interesting with these ‘products of semiosis’ — while these 
are often very different from the structures that appear without any 
semiotic control in the non-living world, these may also be indistin-
guishable from the latter. An oligopeptide produced by a cell may be 
indistinguishable from an oligopeptide which has formed by a 
stochastic condensation of aminoacids, likewise a replacement of some 
stones in a stony seashore may be indistinguishable from a replace-
ment resulted by waves, or even CO2 synthesised by cells via 
respiration is as much CO2 as the one that comes from burning. The 
products of life in these examples are not just indistinguishable - these 
are the same as the ones that are not products of life.  
The latter implies something important. Because if the human-
made artefacts are mostly well distinguishable from the things that are 
naturally formed in the non-living world, then due to the bio-
semiotically well-argued shift of semiotic threshold from the border of 
culture to the border of life, the distinction between the natural and 
life-made becomes structurally indistinguishable. In other words, what 
is made turns out to be both identical and non-identical to the things 
what are not made. 
This is a very interesting case from the logical point of view, 
because on the one hand the distinction would need a term, but on the 
other hand, if we would introduce such a term, this would inevidently 
lead to a wish to define the qualitative difference — which is absent. 
Life is qualitatively different from non-life, but what it produces is 
both different and non-different.  
How to solve this problem? 
The solution would obviously require a more detailed description 
of the semiotic control.  
The functional cycle (in Uexküll’s sense) as a model of semiosis can 
be of some use here. It has always a double relation (recognition and 
action) to the object. This demonstrates well that from the side of 
recognition, the distinction is always qualitative, because the recog-
nition of an object is controlled by memory. The results of an action 
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(production, manufacturing), however, are not directly controlled — 
the only way to control it will be again via a recognition. The action 
does some work — but this work may do almost everything. It may 
build, and it may destroy. In this sense, as the activities of life, even 
building and destroying turn out not to be basically different. 
Decomposition and synthesis are equally the parts of life’s metabolism 
and activities, and these may become distinguishable only for some 
higher forms of life; both may need energy, both may need semiotic 
control; there is no principal difference at the level of enzymatic 
processes, whether the process is establishing or removing a chemical 
bond. Both may be exergonic or endergonic. Even the concept of 
negentropy does not make a difference here. Thus, indeed, life (the 
semiotic control) may influence almost any process in almost any way.  
Which means that knowing obviously always does more than it knows. 
 
H. You are right. There is no simple way to distinguish a molecule that 
is synthesized under semiotic control from exactly the same molecule 
arising spontaneously. I discussed this problem in a paper titled How 
does a molecule become a message in which I concluded,  
 
A molecule does not become a message because of any particular shape 
or structure or behavior of the molecule. A molecule becomes a message 
only in the context of a larger system of physical constraints which I 
have called a ‘language’ in analogy to our normal usage of the concept of 
message. (Pattee 1969) 
 
And as we agree, the simplest language or semiotic control process 
arises in the simplest self-replicating unit.  
 
 
2. The principles and discoveries 
 
K. For me, there are two fundamental observations or discoveries — 
or results — upon which the whole semiotic biology stands.  
The first is the explanation for the biodiversity of species, and the 
variety of the types of categorizations. This is the answer to the 
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question ‘Why there are species in the living world?’ To put it very 
briefly, the biosemiotic answer is that communication (biparental 
reproduction being a kind of communication) in the non-categorised 
set of individuals would not be stable (Kull 1992). In other words, this 
is to explain why communication creates discretizations.  
The second is the plurality of objects in the semiosphere. A thing in 
the physical world is just one, whereas in the semiotic world it is 
always many, it just cannot be one until it has a meaning (Kull 2007). 
Semiosis makes the world plural. Like, for instance, a painting — 
physically, it is a concrete pattern of pigments, but semiotically it is 
many things that can be recognised (or to what it refers).  
From your point of view, what are the most important observa-
tions that motivated your interest in biosemiotics? And what are the 
important biosemiotic discoveries? 
 
H. Living systems have always been a challenge, even a threat, to 
physicists who believe their laws are universal in principle, but appear 
to be no help in explaining life. How do you explain why living systems 
are so clearly different from non living systems when they both obey 
exactly the same laws? That was the question that first motivated me. I 
first saw this question in Karl Pearson’s Grammar of Science (1937: 
287), a copy of which my Headmaster gave to me in the 8th grade. I 
still have the book and refer to it. Many physicists worried about this 
problem, like Erwin Schrödinger, Niels Bohr, and Max Delbrück who 
are well known for their writing on the subject. Linguists, on the other 
hand, are understandably not concerned about this problem. 
    
 
3. Roots and reminiscences 
 
K. Semiotic biology is polyphyletic — it has several roots. Even the 
term ‘biosemiotics’ has been coined independently couple of times.7 
                                                 
7   Probably Rothschild’s (1962) and Stepanov’s (1971) usage of the term ‘bio-
semiotic’ were independent.  
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Contemporary biosemiotics includes scholars from different back-
grounds and with different use of terminology, who after having re-
cognized that their understandings match, accepted to build a shared 
conceptual apparatus, a common discourse.  
The components of ideas that led me finally (in the end of 1980s) 
to biosemiotics, as I would reconstruct these now, include seemingly 
(a) my early and strong (and continuous) interest in theoretical bio-
logy (which led me to exchange a few letters with Conrad H. Wad-
dington and Robert Rosen, in 1970s); (b) a strong semiotic (however, 
mainly cultural semiotic) school in Tartu; (c) contacts with biologists 
of non-neodarwinian views (on the one hand among Russian scholars, 
followers of the school of Lev Berg and Alexandr Lubischev, including 
the biologists of my own generation Sergey Chebanov and Alexei 
Sharov, and on the other hand the scholars carrying the tradition of 
Karl Ernst von Baer in Estonia); (d) my former participation in the 
research group of animal behaviour studies where I came across with 
Jakob von Uexküll’s works (the search of his traces resulted in contacts 
with Thure von Uexküll, and via him with Thomas Sebeok); and 
certainly (e) the modelling research I carried out via which I under-
stood the mechanism that is responsible for the emergence of species 
(which is very close to Hugh Paterson’s recognition of the concept of 
species). After all this, and since the meeting with our Danish colleages 
Jesper Hoffmeyer and Claus Emmeche in early 1990s, biosemiotics 
remained the stable name for the work that followed. 
Histories of life, of course, are always plural. What are the paths 
that led you to biosemiotics? 
 
H. Well, it was not only Pearson’s question of why life is so different 
from nonliving systems when they both obey exactly the same laws. It 
was Pearson’s idealistic view even about physical theory that replaced 
my naive realism in thinking about both physics and biology. He made 
me see how all of our models are based on epistemological assump-
tions and limited by our modes of thought. Einstein’s epistemology 
was influenced by Pearson’s Grammar. Heinrich Hertz expressed 
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these limitations of our models in his Principles of Mechanics (Hertz 
1956 [1894]: 1–2):  
 
We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the 
form which we give them is such that the logically necessary conse-
quents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary 
consequents in nature of the things pictured. 
[...] For our purpose it is not necessary that they [images] should be in 
conformity with the things in any other respect whatever. As a matter of 
fact, we do not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our 
conceptions of things are in conformity with them in any other than this 
one fundamental respect.” 
 
Besides Hertz’s separation of the knower and the known, there was 
von Neumann’s (1955: 419–420) discussion of measurement in which 
he shows why an epistemic cut between them is a conceptual necessity, 
although its placement is largely arbitrary. It was also von Neumann’s 
(1966) logic of self-replication that made clear the necessity of sym-
bolic description as distinct from material dynamics to allow an 
unlimited evolution of novelty. 
I have acknowledged elsewhere (Pattee 2001) some of the other 
physicists, biologists, and philosophers that have influenced my 
thought. 
 
K. There are several approaches and scholars whom we can identify as 
biosemioticians but who themselves did not know or use that term. 
For instance, after reading Robert Rosen’s (1991) Life itself, I realised 
that he had reached the biosemiotic understanding — his emphasis is 
on the triadic relation.  
 
H. There were indeed many physicists and biologists who, beginning 
in the 1950s, belonged to what Gunther Stent called the Information 
School of molecular biology (Stent 1968). It was generally recognized 
by this group that there was more to biology than just the molecular 
structures of DNA and proteins. Their focus on information clearly 
was a semiotic perspective.  
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Rosen was not a part of this group, but his emphasis on “relational 
biology” depended on semiotic rather than material relations. Rosen 
and I were friends for many years beginning with our studies of 
hierarchy theory in the 1960s. To us, hierarchies, like measurement, 
are also dependent on semiotic distinctions because hierarchical levels 
are recognized by the necessity of different descriptions. We also 
focussed on epistemology. Rosen’s modeling relation was based on 
Hertz’s statement above (Pattee 2007).  
      
 
4. The way to proceed 
 
K. A large part of the existing biosemiotic studies has been devoted to 
theoretical and philosophical questions. However, what should the se-
miotic approach mean for biological experiments and observations, 
what is its relationship to empirical studies?8 
 
H. I see this question as the central issue for biosemiotics. Earlier in 
our discussion you mentioned the “need for a special term” for struc-
tures arising from semiosis. This terminology problem is a symptom 
of a larger problem that biosemiotics is facing. It is already clear from 
our discussion that my physics language is different from your 
semiotic language; but the problem is deeper than language. Physics 
and semiotics have two very different cultures, and biochemistry is a 
third culture. The problem is even worse because all these areas have 
subcultures with their special foci and terminologies.  
I’m sure you are aware of this culture problem. The two of us are 
both motivated to try to resolve our different language problem by 
discussions like this one. Unfortunately this is not the common moti-
vation of most biochemists. When they are confronted with the bio-
semiotics perspective, they often resist semiotic expression of the 
problems of life as nothing but restatements of what they describe in 
                                                 
8   Some points on the role of biosemiotic empirical research are described in 
Kull, Emmeche, Favareau 2008.  
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their well-developed material language, which they regard as a more 
scientific description of life.  
It is not clear to me what biosemiotics wants to be. All I can suggest 
is that if its practitioners want it to be accepted as science rather than 
as philosophy, they must focus more on empirically decidable models, 
rather than emphasizing its linguistic and philosophical foundations. 
In other words, if biosemiotics claims that symbolic control is the 
distinguishing characteristic of life, and if it also claims to be a science, 
then it must clearly define symbols and codes in empirical scientific 
terms that are more familiar to physicists and molecular biologists.  
On the other hand, if biosemiotics is not primarily the study of 
symbolic matter but the study of symbolic meaning, then as I have 
emphasized (Pattee 2008), this requires a different epistemological 
principle than does the study of physics and biology. It will also 
require a language more familiar to philosophers and linguists.  
One must keep in mind that the biosemiotic concepts like symbol 
function and meaning arise only by natural or cultural selection from 
those constraint structures that physical laws do not determine; and yet 
all physical laws as well as all scientific models must be expressed in 
such symbol systems.  
 
K. What should be the main biosemiotic questions in which the 
further research in biosemiotics should focus on? Can we give a brief 
list of these? 
 
H. Again, it is not clear what the main contributions of biosemiotics 
will turn out to be. As we learn more about the complexity of genetic 
expression, the analogies of genetic memory and natural language may 
not carry beyond the fact that they both use discrete, linear strings 
from a small arbitrary alphabet. So far, we have found nothing in the 
network of neurons in the brain that interprets sentences anything like 
the cell interprets genes by the construction of proteins. 
Molecular biology is currently totally involved with sophisticated 
technologies trying to unravel the functions and linkages in the masses 
of gene sequences data. These technologies already have specialized 
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names like genomics, proteomics, and even transcriptomics. Even 
though all these studies could be correctly described as biosemiotics, I 
think it is very unlikely that the biosemiotic literature will alter the 
style or language of these highly competitive and incredibly complex 
empirical technologies.  
In my opinion, biosemiotics will make the most lasting contri-
bution by addressing the classical problems inherent in symbolic 
description and control of material systems at all levels ― the symbol-
matter problem. In this way it will contribute most to the epistemic 
foundations of all the sciences, of both the living and the nonliving. 
 
K. The main reason why we are developing the biosemiotic concepts is 
obviously just our wish to understand why and how life works. Since 
the questions we are dealing with are quite fundamental and related to 
several central questions of biology, it will also mean a reformulation 
(or rebuilding) of theoretical biology in many of its parts. Much of it 
comes out as a consequence from the application of the models of 
semiosis. The biosemiotic improvement of models of semiosis would 
probably also influence the whole theory of semiotics, which in its 
turn has consequences for humanities and for the relationship 
between physical sciences and humanities.9 
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Биосемиотическая беседа: между физикой и семиотикой 
 
В этом диалоге мы говорим о контрасте между непреложными зако-
нами физики и семиотической свободой жизни. Мы приходим к 
выводу, что необходимы дополнительные виды описания для мате-
риальных и символических структур, а также и для многих иерархи-
ческих уровней этих структур. Далее дается разъяснение того, что мы 
имеем в виду под понятиями «законы», «ограничения», «правила», 
«символы», «память», «интерпретаторы» и «семиотический конт-
роль». Кроме того, мы кратко характеризуем путь, который привел 
нас в биосемиотику, и размышляем о будущем биосемиотики. 
 
 
Biosemiootiline vestlus: füüsika ja semiootika vahel 
 
Käesolevas dialoogis räägime kontrastist vääramatute füüsikaseaduste ja 
elu semiootilise vabaduse vahel. Leiame, et on vaja komplementaarseid 
kirjeldusviise materiaalsete ja sümboolsete struktuuride, nagu ka nende 
struktuuride paljude hierarhiliste tasandite jaoks. Selgitame, mida peame 
silmas mõistete “seadused”, “piirangud”, “reeglid”, “sümbolid”, “mälu”, 
“tõlgendajad” ja “semiootiline kontroll” all. Peale selle kirjeldame lühidalt 
isiklikke taustu, mis meid kumbagi biosemiootika juurde tõi, ja speku-
leerime biosemiootika tulevikusuundade üle. 
 
